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The political economy of industrialisation and industrial 
relations: a rejoinder 
 
 
Sarosh Kuruvilla 
 
School of Industrial Relations, Cornell University 
 
It is always an honour when one’s work receives a degree of attention entailing the production of a 
formal, written criticism. And this presents an opportunity for the original writer to clarify his/her 
argument, retract/modify that which has been cogently called into question, and to advance dialogue on 
issues regarding the interpretation of social reality about which reasonable people disagree. Gregor 
Gall’s comments on my article present these very opportunities, and I welcome this chance to make a 
dialogical contribution that hopefully will promote the theoretical development of the field. 
As I understand them, Gall’s criticisms regarding my work are as follows: 
 
 
1. The argument fails “to give weight to the contingencies of political economy” and “in 
particular political dynamics are given no weight in intervening and mediating the sphere of 
industrial relations.” Most significantly, the argument unjustifiably ignores “a consideration of 
the role of labour as an active participant which can act independently rather than just be acted 
upon.” 
2. The argument mischaracterises industrial relations under ISI, ignoring suppressive elements. 
 
3. “there is an overestimation of the degree and nature of change [in IR] from ISI to EOI. In 
part this stems from confusing further regulation of the labour market with suppression of 
workers’ rights.” 
4. “the degree to which low cost labour is key to attracting FDI is exaggerated.” 
 
5. The argument exaggerates/mischaracterizes the shift in IR policy with change from EOI-Stage 1 
to Stage 2 by claiming change in emphasis from cost-containment to work force flexibility and 
skills development as IR goals. Moreover  the argument ignores the fact that “where any 
relaxation has taken place, this is as a result of the activity and growing strength of organised 
labour, allied to or part of a pro-democracy movement.” 
 
6. “Kuruvilla makes no attempt to explore the basis of how and why the oppositional force of 
organised labour develops and how this might be related to different regimes of industrialization 
or industrialisation in general.” 
7. “In regard to specific characteristics of Kuruvilla’s ISI model, it is unhelpful to begin such an 
analysis with the period of independence for this underestimates the degrees of continuity in 
state policy towards labour given that the colonial period as often heavily coloured postcolonial 
IR.” 
8. The argument fails to recognise that “industrialisation strategies and industrial relations 
are not necessarily or always ‘mutually reinforcing’.” 
 
These are all important criticisms that demand response. Criticism 2 through 5 (and 7) mainly 
 
deal with issues of classification and characterisation of change in the context of industrialisation 
strategy and IR change, while 1, 6, and 8 have more to do with issues of causation. Given this distinction, 
this response will be divided accordingly. 
 
 
Matters of classification and interpretation 
 
 
 
Gregor Gall puts forth two contentions regarding my interpretation of IR policy under ISI. The first raises 
an important methodological consideration in any comparative historical analysis, the issue of 
periodisation. Gall claims that it is not helpful to analyse IR policy under ISI starting with Independence 
because doing so “underestimates the degree of continuity in state policy towards labour given that the 
colonial period has often heavily coloured post-colonial IR.” As an empirical claim, I could not agree 
more with this comment. Indeed, I’ve recently edited a book that seeks to uncover the influence of 
colonial labour policy on postcolonial IR systems in a variety of national and regional contexts [1]. 
Moreover, I recognize as much in the text of one of my works eg. “During the ISI phase, the focus of 
IR/HR policy was pluralistic, with little effort to tinker with inherited IR/HR institutions, which were 
primarily American” [2]. 
However, to the extent that Gregor Gall claims that the recognition of this fact is detrimental to 
my argument, I disagree. My argument is not so much that changes in industrialization strategies are the 
direct cause of changes in IR policy as that governments in my cases reconfigured IR policy to make it 
consonant with the industrialisation strategy. In the rare case where existing IR policy is indeed 
harmonious (eg. in the shift to independence and from traditional export policies to ISI), then no such 
changes will be evident. 
Gall’s second criticism of my interpretation of IR policy under ISI is that I mischaracterize it by 
understating/ignoring its suppressive elements. On this point, I would like to highlight the fact that I do 
use the term ‘controlled pluralism’ in an effort to avoid this pitfall. However, it is fair to say that I was 
not clear enough on this point. In using the term pluralism, I was attempting to capture the fact that 
governments under ISI in my cases placed little or no regulation on collective bargaining between unions 
and employers, leaving bargaining issues and outcomes to be left to the compromises between these 
two actors, their actions (eg. strikes and lock-outs) and the power distribution between them. 
However, as Gall states, it is indeed true that the concerned governments at the same time placed 
extensive restrictions on trade union formation and internal composition; and, as Deyo points out, these 
often had more to do with politics (especially regime stability) than economics [3]. What is clearly 
needed is a concept that captures this somewhat contradictory tendency of extensive control of working 
class organisations coupled with considerable voluntarism with respect to direct relations between 
employers and these organisations. Hiers, for one, has suggested the term ‘ostensible voluntarism’ [4].* 
This confusion over classification of IR policy under ISI directly affects Gall’s next criticism. 
 
I believe, namely that I exaggerate the extent of change in policy in the transition from ISI to EOI. By 
pointing out the extensive controls on labour organisation that existed prior to EOI, Gall claims that I 
overstate the degree to which the change in industrialization strategy was paralleled by a shift to a more 
suppressive IR policy because of my “confusing further regulation of the labour market with suppression 
of workers’ rights.” Let me state straightaway that I do not disagree with the claim that IR policy changes 
under EOI constituted further regulation, as the above paragraph suggests. However, I continue to 
contend that IR policy changed in a qualitatively significant way that was consonant with the change in 
industrialization strategy. With the shift to EOI, the governments in my cases expanded their regulatory 
focus beyond working class organisations and into the arena formerly left for the relatively free play of 
unions and management, especially bargaining and strikes/lockouts. While controls on labour 
organisations under ISI served mainly political goals, this change in policy under EOI #1 entailed an 
important shift to economic concerns, namely cost-containment. It was not until the shift to EOI 
#1 that, for example, the Malaysian government prohibited collective bargaining outcomes above the 
national minimum standards in export processing zones and took away labour’s right to organise the 
first five years of a given firm’s operations in the ‘pioneer industries’. Thus, although IR policy under 
EOI #1 represented an extension of regulation rather than a remaking of regulation anew, two points 
are significant: 
1) the IR policy changes temporally coincided with the industrialisation strategy shift (suggesting a prima 
facie linkage between the two) 
2) these policy changes constituted a qualitative shift toward a significant concern with containing costs, 
consistent with the successful use of EOI #1. 
A second related criticism of my classification of IR policy under EOI #1 has less to do with its 
contrast/similarity with that under ISI and more to do with the importance of cost-containment under 
this industrialization strategy (and thus calls into question the linkage between IR and industrialisation 
strategies, even if IR policies suggest the goal of cost-containment). Gregor Gall argues that in my 
argument “the degree to which low cost labour is key to attracting FDI is exaggerated”, and he highlights 
the importance of “glocalisation, [or] the establishment of MNC production facilities to service local 
markets” as “a countervailing tendency.” If Gall means that factors in addition to low cost labour such as 
infrastructure, tax policy, etc. are important in attracting FDI, then I could not agree more. 
However, three points are important here. The first is that pointing out the importance of these factors 
 
does not preclude low cost labour’s significance. Second, although placing limitations on the right to 
strike in ‘essential’ industries can serve the goal of providing a reliable infrastructure, the only one of 
these enabling factors that IR policy (my dependent variable, after all) could have a substantial impact 
on is the cost of labour (and, besides, more extensive restrictions on strikes in essential industries were 
implemented at the time of the shift to EOI #1); I never meant to suggest that IR policy and its 
promotion of low labour costs was the only initiative undertaken by the state to attract FDI but rather 
that there is evidence that IR policy was reconfigured in a way that would aid the successful undertaking 
of this industrialisation strategy (in addition probably to policies toward public sector industries, tax 
structure, etc.). Third, if Gall wishes to claim that cost containment is not of central importance to the 
pursuit of EOI #1 (along with other factors), then I would have to disagree and point to the character of 
this strategy and the type of investment under it. Emphasising the export of labour-intensive, light 
manufactures, EOI #1 makes it essential for states to deliver low cost labour to prospective investors. 
A final criticism made by Gall regarding my classification of IR policy goals under different 
 
industrialisation strategies relates to EOI #2. The claim is that I overstate the shift from cost- 
containment to work force flexibility and skills development because 
a) wages and unit labour costs are still important; 
 
b) labour repression is still widespread, 
 
c) where any shift away from cost-containment has taken place, it has been due to the “growing 
 
strength of organised labour, allied to or part of a pro-democracy movement”. 
 
With respect to ‘c’, it is notable that one of my own cases (Singapore) is a clear example of a 
 
shift away from cost containment (witness the 12 percent per year increase in wages between 1979 and 
 
1981 to drive out labour-intensive investors in favour of more capital-intensive ones) without the 
existence of either strong union pressure to do so or a democratisation movement. Perhaps Gall 
confuses my argument of a shift away from cost containment with the claim that repression and cost 
concerns fade altogether from national IR policy. Instead, however, I argue that goals of workforce 
flexibility and skills development come to the forefront under EOI #2 i.e. their relative importance 
changes. This does not mean that repressive regulations and a concern for costs become irrelevant; 
 
indeed, repressive regulations, although usually less stringent than under 
 
EOI #1, can help to further these broader goals. 
 
 
 
Theoretical considerations 
 
 
 
Gall is clearly in disagreement with me given his interpretation of my causal argument and framework 
for approaching the linkage between industrialisation strategies and IR. He argues that a major 
weakness of my argument is that “political dynamics are given no weight in intervening and mediating 
the sphere of industrial relations”. There is a particular concern that labour is accorded no agency and 
that my argument “makes no attempt to explore the basis of how and why the oppositional force of 
organised labour develops and how this might be related to different regimes of industrialisation or 
industrialisation in general”. Moreover, in part because I ignore these political factors, Gall claims that 
my argument fails to recognise that “industrialization strategies and industrial relations are not 
necessarily or always ‘mutually reinforcing’.” Thus, Gall suggests that the introduction of political factors 
could serve to complicate my framework for analysis and provide it with more explanatory power. 
In response to these criticisms, a first point is that I do not hold the belief that IR and 
 
IS are always mutually reinforcing. Although my earliest work might have suggested as much, my latest 
article on this topic indicates that I am making a normative policy argument based on an empirically 
identified linkage in my particular cases. I open my conclusion with the following: “The results of this 
paper suggest that congruence between IS and IR/HR policy goals is an important precondition for 
successful economic development” [6]. Thus, rather than arguing that IR and IS are always mutually 
reinforcing, I instead argue that they should be in order to promote successful economic development. 
A second point is that I did not intend in any of my work to offer a generalizable framework for 
 
the study of industrialization and IR, but have saved such a task for later work [7]. Thus, when Gall states 
that he “has sought to assert the importance of political contingency and dynamics to establish the 
proper and full context of political economy for a credible analysis of the relationship between 
industrialisation and IR in south and south-east Asia,” I believe that Gall makes an important 
contribution toward such a generalisable framework. My goals were more modest ie., to suggest that 
the IR and IS are often mutually reinforcing. And I chose to focus my attention on the relationship 
between the two, rather than to create a generalisable theory.** 
A third and final point is that, while I agree that my model undertheorises political factors 
(especially for the purposes of more generalizable analysis), I do not think it is true that “political 
dynamics [including labour action] are given no weight in intervening and mediating the sphere of 
industrial relations”. Gregor Gall himself quotes me as saying that “institutional arrangements used to 
meet national IR/HR policy goals are dependent on the choices governments make, and these choices 
are constrained by political conditions (for example, the power of the ruling party and the influence of 
unions) as well as previous institutional history”[9] and immediately follows this quotation by suggesting 
that I argue that “the government and the state” are the sole determiners of IR policy, which ignores “a 
consideration of the role of labour as an active participant which can act independently rather than just 
be acted upon.” As my own quotation indicates, though, this is clearly not the case: rather than acting in 
a vacuum, governments “are constrained by political conditions (for example, the power of the ruling 
party and the influence of the unions)” (emphasis added). In fairness, though, this nod to labour’s agency 
is rather brief and probably could have been better explained.† 
Nonetheless, this quotation clearly indicates that it is not accurate to argue that “political 
dynamics are given no weight in intervening and mediating the sphere of industrial relations” (emphasis 
added). Yet, there are more indications. One example is my discussion of the Philippines where my 
analysis integrates political factors to explain how political change resulted in different IR policies to 
pursue the same end of cost containment: 
“Although the focus of the cost-containment- oriented labour policy was consistent with a low- 
cost primary EOI strategy, the institutional industrial relations arrangements varied across different 
political regimes. During the Marcos dictatorship labour relations were extremely repressive. During the 
Aquino and Ramos governments, in contrast, democratisation led to the removal of the restrictive IR/HR 
policies of the Marcos era. However, the liberalisation of labour regulations to make union formation 
easier has resulted in an increasingly fragmented labour movement. Furthermore, declines in real wages 
and job security, the downward revision in labour standards, and extremely weak union movement 
indicate that IR/HR policies have helped sustain the low-cost development strategy [10]. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
I thus agree with Gregor Gall’s general call for a more comprehensive theory that explains the 
relationship between IS and IR, especially one that pays greater attention to political dynamics and 
unions themselves, and the many assertions that Gall has made in his comment on my article is clearly a 
step in the right direction. My goals have been much more modest than what he gives me credit for. 
Although I recognise the importance of political factors, I have not developed on this aspect in my work 
because I intended to focus on the link between economic issues and industrial relations, and my work 
suggests that there has been a ‘fit’ between these. 
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important contribution towards a generalisable framework but not one directly critical of my argument 
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